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ONLY WHEN THEY'RE BAD: THE RIGHTS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OUR CHILDREN
INTRODUCTION
"Juvenile Justice Grows Up."' "It's Not a Slap on Wrist."'2 "New
Law to Crack Down on Juveniles." 3 These headlines from St. Louis
newspapers ushered in Missouri's new juvenile crime law with
promises to be tough on crime.4 Like an increasing number of states,
Missouri is responding to the problem of juvenile crime by making it
easier for juvenile courts to waive jurisdiction and prosecute children
1. Nordeka English, Warning: Juvenile Justice Grows Up; 'It's Not a slap on Wrist,'
Judge Tells Forum Audience, METRO ST. CHARLES POST, Sept. 5, 1995, at IC.
2. Id.
3. Martha Shirk, New Law to Crack Down on Juveniles; Backers Seek to Deter Crime;
Some Offlcials Fear Workload, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 27, 1995, at IA.
4. Mark Schlinkmann & Kim Bell, Carnahan Signs Juvenile Crime Bill; Allows Trial as
Adults in Serious Cases, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 13, 1995, at lB. Missouri Governor
Mel Carnahan commented on the new laws: "Now, these teen-agers will know that there is a
risk, and it is real time in a real prison." Id.
5. Judicial waiver is the process by which a juvenile judge decides to transfer a case to
adult criminal court. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT 85 (1995). Judicial waiver is the
most common method of getting a minor into adult criminal court. Id. The judicial waiver
procedure involves a hearing in which the juvenile judge evaluates a number of factors, such as
the child's age and the seriousness of the crime, to determine whether to try the child in juvenile
court or transfer him to a court of general jurisdiction. Id.
There are two other ways in which a minor may end up in criminal court: prosecutorial
discretion and statutory exclusion. Id. Prosecutorial discretion refers to the authority of the state
prosecutor to decide whether to file charges in juvenile or criminal court. Id. at 87. Only a few
states allow this type of transfer. Id. Statutory exclusion refers to the process of legislatively
excluding minors from juvenile court. Id. at 88. This exclusion is usually based on the age of
Washington University Open Scholarship
274 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
as adults.6 Recent amendments to the Missouri juvenile code reflect a
growing dissatisfaction with the traditional operation of the state's
juvenile justice system.7
the minor (for example, excluding everyone over age 16 from juvenile jurisdiction) or is based
on the seriousness of the offense (for example, excluding murder or other serious offenses
against the person from juvenile jurisdiction). Id.
6. Missouri State Senator Joe Moseley explained the rationale for the new amendments:
"[The new amendments] will make it clear to juveniles that they're going to be held accountable
for their behavior. I think it's going to get their attention." Shirk, supra note 3, at IA. State
Representative Phil Smith commented that law "ensure[s] that those juveniles who do commit
violent crimes are punished accordingly." Id.
7. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.071.1 (1996). Missouri's new amendments make a number of
significant changes. The amendments particularly relevant to this Note are changes made to
waiver guidelines. For example, the age at which a child charged with any crime may be
subjected to a waiver hearing, at the court or the prosecution's discretion, has been lowered
from 14 to 12 years old. Id. The amendments also eliminate any minimum age requirement for
ordering a waiver hearing when a child is charged with one of the "seven deadly sins" (first
degree murder, second degree murder, assault, rape, sodomy, robbery and distribution of drugs),
or when a child has committed two prior felonies. Id. If a child fits into one of these two
categories, the waiver hearing is mandatory. Id. The Missouri legislature also amended the
criteria a juvenile court must consider when deciding whether or not to waive jurisdiction.
Juvenile courts must now consider ten factors during a waiver hearing:
(1) the seriousness of the offense alleged and whether the protection of the community
requires transfer to the court of general jurisdiction; (2) whether the offense alleged
involved viciousness, force and violence; (3) whether the offense alleged was against
persons or property with greater weight being given to the offense against persons,
especially if personal injury resulted; (4) whether the offense alleged is a part of a
repetitive pattern of offenses which indicates that the child may be beyond
rehabilitation under the juvenile code, (5) the record and history of the child, including
experience with the juvenile justice system, other courts, supervision, commitments to
juvenile institutions and other placements; (6) the sophistication and maturity of the
child as determined by consideration of his home and environmental situation,
emotional condition and pattern of living; (7) the age of the child; (8) the program and
facilities available to the juvenile court in considering disposition; (9) whether or not
the child can benefit from the treatment or rehabilitative programs available to the
juvenile court; and (10) racial disparity in certification.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.071.6 (1996). Compare Missouri's factors with the criteria suggested by
the Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966), discussed infra note
54.
Although the list of factors used to determine whether to waive jurisdiction includes
consideration of both the gravity of the offense and the child's "amenability to rehabilitation,"
Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.071.6 (1996), it remains to be seen whether the courts will give equal
weight to each element. The current law does not require that each factor be given equal weight.
Id. In addition, it is not entirely clear what "amenability to rehabilitation" means. See Edward P.
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The trend in state juvenile law towards prosecuting juveniles as
adults raises a number of questions: Why is there a separate juvenile
justice system and what is its intended function? Should minors who
commit crimes be treated the same as adults? If delinquent juveniles
are treated as adults, then what are the implications for the treatment
of non-delinquent children?
These are not novel questions! Current state trends towards
increasing criminal accountability,9 however, have shifted the focus
Mulvey, Judging Amenability to Treatment in Juvenile Offenders, in CHILDREN, MENTAL
HEALTH, AND THE LAW 195, 200 (N. Dickon Reppucci et a]. eds., 1984) ("mhe amenability
determination is difficult to isolate in operational terms."); Abbe Smith, They Dream of
Growing Older: On Kids and Crime, 36 B.C. L. REV. 953, 1012 (1995) ("What does it mean for
a juvenile not to be 'amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system'?"). Indeed,
the fact that an age minimum has been eliminated for violent crimes suggests that the gravity of
the offense may be the determining factor in a waiver decision.
8. The United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the function of juvenile
courts almost thirty years ago. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court recognized that
under the then-current application ofjuvenile justice, a child received none of the Constitutional
protections that adults were given. Id. at 17. The Court also noted that children were not getting
the benevolent rehabilitation envisioned for the juvenile court system. Justice Fortas noted that:
"[A child in the juvenile court system] receives the worst of both worlds ... he gets neither the
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children." Id. at 18 n.23 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966)). Stating that
"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone," id. at 13, and
"the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court," id. at 28, the Court proceeded
to establish the basic adversarial rights guaranteed to juveniles under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 31-57. The Court held that a minor has a Constitutional right
to notice of the charges against him, a right to counsel, a privilege against self-incrimination,
and a right to cross-examination. Id.
See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (deciding whether the
execution of a 15 year old boy is constitutional); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-17 (1979)
(addressing whether a child is entitled to an adversarial hearing before being committed to a
psychiatric hospital). See also John E. Coons et al., Puzzling Over Children's Rights, 1991
B.Y.U. L. REV. 307 (1991) (addressing when childhood begins and ends, and the duties and
responsibilities of children).
9. For at least the last 70 years, a significant number of states have allowed transfers of
juveniles to criminal court. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 85. But the traditional
process by which juveniles were transferred was an individualized, case-by-case determination.
Id. In the last 20 years, the process has moved toward a generalized determination based on the
age of the offender and/or the seriousness of the offense. Id.
According to national statistics compiled in 1994, at least 25 states allow judicial waiver of
juvenile jurisdiction by age 14, although there is tremendous variation among the states
regarding the minimum age and process through which waiver occurs. NEAL MILLER, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE LAWS ON PROSECUTORS' AND JUDGES' USE OF JUVENILE RECORDS
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of juvenile justice systems from rehabilitation to punishment. °
Implicit in this trend is a growing acceptance of the idea that
adolescents" possess sufficient competence and legal capacity 2 to be
held criminally responsible.
While this trend in juvenile law flourishes, non-delinquent youth
are still presumed to lack the level of competence necessary to
exercise the same legal rights as adults.'" Although different policy
considerations account for this disparity, 4 the result is that the law
holds minors criminally responsible while denying them many legal
rights outside the area of delinquency.
This Note examines the current state trend toward higher
accountability for delinquents, with the implicit presumption of
competence, and compares this trend to areas of law in which
adolescents are still presumed to be incapable of independent
decisionmaking. Part I examines the historical context in which the
separate juvenile justice system was created and its original
philosophy and function. Part II provides a brief overview of the
current legal status of minors and discusses the inconsistent legal
13-14 (1995). In the last two years, 10 more states have lowered the minimum age for waiver of
juvenile jurisdiction to 14 years old. ABC World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast, Jan.
30, 1996) [hereinafter World News]. For an analysis of the problems involving the access and
effectiveness of counsel resulting from the recent trends in juvenile law reform, see generally
PATRICIA PURITZ, AMERICAN BAR ASSOC. JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER, A CALL FOR JUSTICE:
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS (1995).
10. By 1990, at least 25 states had "to protect society" as their stated purpose for their
youth corrections statutes while only 11 states had the goal of meeting the needs of delinquent
youth. SUSAN GUARINO-GHEZZI & EDWARD J. LOUGHRAN, BALANCING JUVENILE JUSTICE 35
(1996).
11. Because states are allowing waiver of juvenile jurisdiction for younger offenders,
children, in addition to adolescents, now face greater legal responsibility. See, e.g., Mo. REV.
STAT. § 211.071(1) (1996) (requiring that a child of any age undergo a waiver hearing if
charged with a serious violent crime).
12. For the purposes of this Note, "capacity" refers to the "mental ability to understand the
nature and effects of one's acts." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 207 (6th ed. 1990).
13. See infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
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approach to delinquent and non-delinquent youth. Part III discusses
the issue of competence and its relevance in affording legal rights and
responsibilities to children. Finally, Part IV proposes that a rebuttable
presumption of competence be established for all children over the
age of fourteen, whether or not they are delinquent.
I. THE HISTORY OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND JUVENILE LAW
At common law, once a child reached the age of criminal
responsibility, he was treated the same as an adult for the purposes of
punishment and accountability for criminal activity. 5 The age of
criminal responsibility was quite young, generally seven years old.'6
After the age of seven, courts did not recognize any diminished
capacity or responsibility on account of an offender's young age.'7
At the same time, common law gave parents almost total authority
over their children, excluding even state intervention concerning
children.' This distribution of authority reflected the notion that
children were the property of their parents, lacking any personal
identity and possessing little value.'9
15. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106 (1909).
16. Id. If found guilty, children this young could be sentenced to prison or even subjected
to the death penalty. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 70.
17. Mack, supra note 15, at 106.
[The state] did not aim to find out what the accused's history was, what his heredity,
his environments, his associations;... It put but one question, 'Has he committed this
crime?' It did not inquire, 'What is the best thing to do for this lad?' It did not even
punish him in a manner that would tend to improve him; the punishment was visited in
proportion to the degree of wrongdoing evidenced by the single act; not by the needs
of the boy, not by the needs of the state.
Id at 107.
Even though children were held responsible for criminal acts, they were considered
incapable of the rationality necessary to hold other rights. See Katherine H. Federle, On the
Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle,
42 DEPAUL L. REV. 983, 987 (1993) (discussing capacity as related to children's rights).
18. Roger J.R. Levesque, International Children's Rights Grow Up: Implications for
American Jurisprudence and Domestic Policy, 24 CAL W. INT'L L.J. 193, 198 (1994).
19. Id. at 199 ("[Children] were fundamentally on par with animals and slaves.").
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The industrialization of the United States altered the traditional
roles within the family, the role of the family within society, and
society's overall view of childhood." One societal response to
industrialization was the development of the Progressive
Movement.2 The Progressive Movement initiated many social
reforms, including changes in the criminal justice system.22 The
Progressives adopted a Positivist theory that focused on reducing
crime by eliminating the underlying causes of criminal behavior
rather than by attempting to deter potential offenders with harsh
punishments.'
In addition to this ideological shift with respect to crime and
criminals, the Progressive Movement also marked the evolution of
societal attitudes concerning childhood and children.24 The belief that
children were merely the property of their parents gave way to the
view that children were developing human beings whose successful
transition to adulthood largely depended on proper care and attention
from their parents.' By the turn of the nineteenth century, the societal
view of children evolved to the point where children were considered
a special class in need of protection and guidance.26 Society viewed
20. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 822 (1988) [hereinafter Feld I].
21. Id. at 823.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 824. Professor Feld defines Positivism as the "effort to identify the antecedent
variables that cause crime and deviance." Id. This approach to crime reduces the moral
responsibility of the actor by focusing on external forces that caused the actor to act, rather than
focusing on the actor's conscious choice to act. Id. Professor Feld notes that the creation of a
distinct juvenile justice system that emphasizes benevolent treatment and guidance was a
natural result of this ideological evolution. Id.
24. Levesque, supra note 18, at 199-200.
25. Id. Some scholars refer to this period as the "child-saving era." Id. at 199. Other
scholars refer to it as the "Progressive Movement." Jennifer D. Tinkler, Note, The Juvenile
Justice System in the United States and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 12 B.C. THIjRD WORLD L.J. 469,476 (1992).
26. Levesque, supra note 18, at 199-200. During this era, society viewed children as
vulnerable and malleable and expected parents to assume responsibility for educating and
raising their children. Id. at 199. The anticipated result was that society as a whole would
benefit from parents' investment in children. Id. at 200. In addition to juvenile delinquency, the
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delinquent behavior as a sign that the needs of children were not
being adequately satisfied.27 In this way, society's view of childhood
and criminal responsibility shifted away from holding all children
above the age of seven criminally responsible for their actions.28
Consistent with the Progressive Movement, reformers pushed for
the special treatment of children who were accused of criminal
activity.29 This effort eventually resulted in the creation of a separate
legal system for juveniles, the juvenile court.3" The goal of the
creators of juvenile courts was to remove children from the adult
court system, which focused on individual responsibility and
punishment for criminal behavior. Reformers envisioned a separate
legal system for juveniles in which judges acknowledged that
children were different from adults and in need of nurturing and
so-called "child-savers" focused their reform efforts on child labor laws and compulsory
education. Id. For a thorough discussion of the "child-savers' contribution to the reform of
juvenile justice, see ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS (1969).
27. Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The
Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323, 325
(1991) ("Delinquency was viewed as an illness brought on by the social diseases of poverty,
parental neglect, ignorance and urban decay.").
28. Id. "[T]he causes of crime did not lie within the will of the individual-especially not
within an individual whose moral code was only partially informed." Id.
29. Mack, supra note 15, at 109. During the period of time that children began to receive
special treatment, another new concept, adolescence, entered American society. Levesque,
supra note 18, at 200. Before the "child-saving era," a child in his teens enjoyed the status of an
adult. Id. However, after society acknowledged adolescence as a distinct developmental period
in a person's life, adolescents were lumped together with children. l Accordingly, society
viewed adolescents as still in need of the guidance and protection of their parents. Id.
30. COMMITTEE ON CHILD PSYCHIATRY, GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY, HOW OLD IS OLD ENOUGH?, THE AGES OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 39
(1989) [hereinafter How OLD IS OLD ENOUGH?]. Chicago is considered the "birthplace of
juvenile justice." Id. at 40. The first juvenile court in this country was established in 1899, in
Cook County, Illinois. Id. at 39. The purpose of the new juvenile court was to guide and protect
children by removing them from adult proceedings. Id.
The creation of the juvenile court system reflected a new understanding of children and
their legal capacities. See supra note 26. The basis of this new understanding under which
children needed special protection, rested on children's incapacity to be rational and their
inability to make competent decisions. Federle, supra note 17.
31. Forst and Blomquist, supra note 27, at 324.
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guidance to correct their delinquent behavior.32 Operating under the
concept of parens patriae,3 juvenile courts attempted to determine
what was in a child's best interest and provide the appropriate
rehabilitative treatment.34 Because the judge acted as the child's
guardian and focused on protecting and rehabilitating the child,
juvenile proceedings were no longer conducted like traditional
criminal proceedings. 5 Instead, the nature of the proceedings
changed from criminal to civil, and, because of the court's role as the
child's guardian, the proceedings were intended to be non-
adversarial.36
The juvenile court was supposed to rely upon psychological
evaluations and social assessments to determine the causes of
delinquent behavior and the proper treatment for children brought
before the court.37 The court was not to give consideration to the
particular criminal acts committed by the children when determining
the intensity or duration of their treatment.38 Because treatments were
32. Id.
33. Literally, parens patriae means "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1114 (6th ed. 1990). The term is used to refer to the state's responsibility to "care for persons
who are unable to care for themselves or whose families are unable to care for them." Forst &
Blomquist, supra note 27, at 325. Interestingly, by asserting its parens patriae authority to act
as the delinquent child's guardian and prescribe some rehabilitative measures, the state
necessarily implies that the child's parents have failed as proper guardians. See Mack, supra
note 15, at 109 ("[Juvenile p]roceedings are brought to have a guardian or representative of the
state appointed to look after the child, to have the state intervene between the natural parent and
the child because the child needs it, as evidenced by some of its acts, and because the parent is
either unwilling or unable to train the child properly.").
34. Operating under the doctrine ofparens patriae also made it possible for juvenile
courts to address the needs of children who had committed "noncriminal offenses," such as not
minding their parents. ALBERT R. ROBERTS, JUVENILE JUSTICE: POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND
SERVICES 58 (1989).
35. Feld I, supra note 20, at 971. Juvenile proceedings were very informal and the court
attempted to avoid any stigma of a criminal proceeding by using a "euphemistic vocabulary."
Id.
36. Forst & Blomquist, supra note 27, at 328. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1967) (describing the original civil nature of the juvenile justice system and its gradual
criminalization).
37. Feld I, supra note 20, at 825.
38. Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study ofJuvenile Justice Law
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based primarily on factors other than the delinquent behavior itself,
children who committed criminal acts of a similar nature could be
subjected to widely varying treatments, ranging from court
supervision to institutionalization for the duration of their minority
status.39 The juvenile court's goal was to assess the progress of each
child on an individualized basis when determining whether he was
ready for release from supervision.4"
Because the juvenile court was meant to be individualized, non-
adversarial, and civil in nature, none of the procedural safeguards
found in criminal proceedings were required in delinquency
proceedings.4' Specifically, in spite of the benevolent intentions of
the creators of the juvenile courts, juvenile dispositions were often
very severe and punitive.42 Broad judicial discretion led to gross
inequalities in the forms and duration of interventions ordered for
juveniles.43  These inequalities were particularly disturbing
considering the fact that the initial purpose of broad judicial
discretion was to create a more understanding system for children.'
The lack of procedural safeguards, coupled with this broad judicial
discretion, prompted critics of the juvenile courts to call for reform.45
Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 971 (1995) [hereinafter Feld H].
39. Id.; Forst & Blomquist, supra note 27, at 326.
40. Forst & Blomquist, supra note 27, at 326.
41. Feld II, supra note 38, at 971. See also Mack, supra note 15, at 109-14 (discussing
early attempts to address the failure of the juvenile court's ability to live up to the court's stated
rehabilitative goals).
42. Forst & Blomquist, supra note 27, at 328.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 328-29. See also ROBERTS, supra note 34, at 72-3 (discussing how the juvenile
court system failed to live up to the envisioned goals of compassionate rehabilitation). The
Supreme Court answered this call when it began addressing whether and what kinds of
procedures a delinquent is due. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 542, 560 (1966) (holding
that a minor is entitled to procedural due process when the state attempts to waive juvenile
junsdiction and try him as an adult); Gault, 387 U.S. at 4 (holding that a minor facing juvenile
adjudication is entitled to procedural due process).
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II. THE CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF CHILDREN
The legal status of children today is a confusing accumulation of
inconsistencies. The Supreme Court has recognized that minors
possess certain constitutional rights in some contexts, but not in
others." Likewise, individual states commonly mandate that juveniles
attain a minimum age before certain rights are available. However,
there is no consistency between the age at which minors are granted
these rights and the age at which minors will be held criminally
responsible for delinquent actions.47
A. Constitutional Protections for Minors
The Supreme Court has spoken on a number of issues regarding
the rights the Constitution guarantees to children.48 As the Court
attempts to balance the interests of parents, the state, and the
individual child, there is no clear understanding of the constitutional
status of minors.49 The Court tends to keep issues regarding the rights
of minors within the juvenile justice system separate from issues
relating to the rights of minors outside the context of delinquency
proceedings."0
The Supreme Court's first significant recognition of a delinquent
juvenile's right to some basic due process protection occurred in Kent
v. United States.5 In Kent, the Court held that juveniles are entitled to
a hearing before a juvenile court can waive juvenile jurisdiction.52
46. See infra notes 48-76 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 51-76 and accompanying text.
49. Levesque, supra note 18, at 202.
50. See infra notes 51-76 and accompanying text
51. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
52. Id. at 560. Kent involved a 16-year-old-boy with a prior juvenile record who was
charged with housebreaking, robbery, and rape. Id. at 543-44. Despite the defense counsel's
request, the juvenile court judge did not allow the defense counsel access to the boy's Social
Service file. Id. at 546. The judge also did not hold a hearing or make any findings of fact
before ruling that he was waiving jurisdiction of the boy and directing that the boy be tried as
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The Court also stated that a juvenile facing a jurisdictional waiver
hearing has the right to have his counsel examine the social records
upon which the juvenile court will base its waiver decision.53
Furthermore, the Court noted that the juvenile court must conduct a
full investigation and offer a statement of the specific reasons for the
transfer, demonstrating that the investigation was thorough. 4
One year later, in In re Gault, 55 the Court enhanced the procedural
protections available to juveniles. After reviewing the original
purposes of creating a separate juvenile court system, the Court
acknowledged that despite the good intentions underlying the non-
adversarial, parens patriae approach to juvenile offenders, the result
of such an approach was inaccurate and unfair dispositions. 6 The
Court then held that juveniles charged with committing delinquent
an adult in a court of general jurisdiction. Id.
53. 383 Us. at 562.
54, Id. at 561. The Court endorsed a list of determinative factors that a juvenile court
should consider when deciding whether or not to waive jurisdiction over a minor. Id. at 566-67.
These factors include: (1) the seriousness of the offense and whether the waiver of jurisdiction
is necessary for the safety of the community; (2) whether the offense "was committed in an
aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner"; (3) whether the offense was committed
against persons; (4) the weight of the evidence against the minor, (5) the importance of
adjudicating multiple complaints in one proceeding when the juvenile's associates are adults;
(6) the maturity of the child (as determined by a social assessment); (7) the record of the minor,
including any previous law enforcement or juvenile court contacts; and (8) the likelihood that
the minor can be rehabilitated. ld
While these guidelines suggest that some measure of fairness and consistency exists among
states regarding the transfer of juveniles to criminal court, commentators point out that "the
Court has not struck down any waiver legislation containing such vague phrases as 'amenability
to treatment,' 'dangerousness,' 'protection of the public,' 'best interests of the public welfare,'
or the nature of the youth's 'family, school and social history."' Forst & Blomquist, supra note
27, at 338.
55. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault involved a 15-year-old boy accused of making a lewd phone
call. Id. at 4. The Juvenile Court Judge committed the boy to the State Industrial School until
age 21. Id. at 7. The minor's parents were never notified of their son's detention and no appeal
was permitted under state law. 1d at 5. Furthermore, the boy was found guilty based on the pure
discretion of the judge and on the boy's reputation rather than any evidence or proof. Id. at 9.
56. Id. at 19. The Court recognized that a juvenile court judge's "unbridled discretion,
however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure."
Id. at 18.
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acts are entitled to basic due process protections.57
After Gault, other Supreme Court decisions further elaborated on
the extent of procedural due process protection available to juveniles.
Specifically, the Court declared that the burden of proof in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding is the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard,58 that juveniles are entitled to protection from double
jeopardy,59 and that minors are competent to waive their rights and
confess to committing crimes without first consulting an attorney.
60
These decisions indicate that the Supreme Court has moved away
from a pure parens patriae approach and toward treating juveniles
57. HI at 13. See also supra note 8 (discussing the due process rights specifically
addressed by the Court).
58. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). Winship involved a twelve-year-old boy
charged with purse-stealing. Id. The trial court convicted the boy on a "preponderance of the
evidence" standard. Id. at 360. The Supreme Court reversed and held that "the constitutional
safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is as important during the adjudicatory stage of
a delinquency proceeding as is "the notice of charges, the right to counsel, the right of
confrontation and examination, and the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 368. The
Court rejected the notion that a civil label meaningfully distinguished a juvenile "conviction"
from a criminal one. Id. at 360. The court focused on the loss of liberty involved and on its
recognition of a minor's due process rights in the Gault decision. Id.
59. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975). Breed involved a minor who was charged
with armed robbery. Id at 521. The juvenile judge found the allegations in the petition were
true and subsequently moved to transfer the juvenile to criminal court. Id. at 523-24. In criminal
court, the minor was again found guilty of armed robbery. Id. at 525. The Supreme Court held
that this violated the Double Jeopardy protection of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
at 531. In its decision, the Court focused on the risk of a deprivation of liberty involved in both
proceedings, and rejected the argument that the juvenile proceeding was merely civil in nature.
Id at 529.
60. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979). Fare involved a 16-year-old boy that
police arrested on suspicion of murder. Id. at 709-10. When questioned by the police, the boy
asked to see his probation officer. Id. at 710. After the police denied the boy's request to see his
probation officer, he proceeded to give a confession without an attorney present. Id. at 710-11.
At his trial, the boy moved to have the confession suppressed on the grounds that the police
violated his Miranda rights when the police denied his request to see his probation officer. Id. at
711-12. The Supreme Court held that a request to see a probation officer is not necessarily the
equivalent of invoking one's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Id. at 723. Rather, the
Court stated that whether this right was invoked must be determined from the totality of the
circumstances. Id. at 724-25. Because the police in Fare advised the boy of his right to an
attorney and the boy declined, and because the boy was familiar with the system, the Court held
that the boy knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Id. at 725-27.
[Vol. 51:273
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol51/iss1/4
1997] THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OUR CHILDREN 285
like adult criminal defendants. 6'
Unlike its approach to the legal status of delinquent minors, the
Supreme Court's approach to the legal status of non-delinquent
minors has been inconsistent. The Court has held that minors are
entitled to certain constitutional rights outside the context of
delinquency proceedings, such as the rights to free speech and
privacy, however, it has refused to extend these rights universally.
62
Areas in which the Court has addressed the constitutional status of
631minors include school activities" and discipline,' abortion rights,65
and the civil commitment of minors to psychiatric facilities.' The
Court's inconsistent rulings concerning the rights of non-delinquent
children are highlighted by the fact that while parents' interests are
rarely, if ever, considered in the context of delinquent children's
rights, parental interests often receive strong consideration when the
Court is addressing the constitutional rights of non-delinquent
children.67
The Court's recognition of the constitutional rights of minors in
61. But see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that the
Constitution does not guarantee a jury trial to a minor undergoing a juvenile court proceeding).
See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830, 838 (1988) (holding that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a convicted murderer who was 15 years old
when he committed the murder because doing so would "offend civilized standards of
decency"). But cf Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that the execution
of a 16-year-old convicted murderer does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
62. See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
63. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
67. The inconsistency in the Court's decisions may result from the fact that when
addressing children's constitutional rights outside the context of criminal activity, the Court
must also take into consideration the rights of parents to raise their children as they see fit. See
Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75 MARQ. L. REV.
569, 581 (1992) ("[C]ourts will, whenever possible, defer to parental authority and preserve the
privacy that has come to be expected by families."); Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses:
Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children's Rights, 16 NOVA L. REv. 711, 714 (1992) ("Courts
are generally unwilling to intrude on intra-familial conflicts unless significant thresholds are
crossed....").
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the school environment is varied. For example, the Court recognized
a minor's First Amendment right to free speech at schools.68 The
Court also recognized a student's right to some procedural due
process protection when faced with suspension, holding that the
student must receive notice of charges and be given an opportunity to
be heard.69 The Court also held, however, that the use of corporal
punishment in public schools does not violate any constitutional
rights of minors and does not require procedural due process.70
The Court has also struggled with a bright line rule regarding a
minor's rights to obtain an abortion. For example, in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,7 the Court upheld a
68. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969). In holding that a school district could not prohibit junior high and high school students
from wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam war, the Court stated: "It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate." L at 506. The Court further stated that "[s]tudents in
school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect.... Id. at 511. See also W. Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (refusing to permit the state to compel students
to salute the flag because it would constitute a violation of the students' First Amendment
rights). But compare the Tinker court's recognition of a student's First Amendment rights to
Free Speech with Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (holding that a New
York law prohibiting the sale of obscene materials to minors under the age of seventeen does
not infringe upon minors' constitutionally protected freedom of expression).
69. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). This case involved nine public high school
students who were suspended from school without a hearing. Id. at 569-70. The Supreme Court
rejected the state's argument that the students did not have a constitutional right to a hearing. Id.
at 572-73. The Court reasoned that the students had a property interest in their public education
that was protected by the Due Process clause. Id. at 573-74. Furthermore, the Court noted that
the students had a liberty interest at stake because of the potential for damage to their
reputations. Id. at 574-75. Accordingly, the Court declared that the students were entitled to
notice of the charges against them and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 581.
70. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977). In Ingraham, a group of junior high
school students alleged that the use of corporal punishment violated that Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 653. The paddling at one particular
school in the district was so severe that one student suffered a hematoma while another student
lost full use of his arm for a week. Id. at 657. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment was
inapplicable to corporal punishment used in public schools because the Eighth Amendment was
intended to address excessive punishment in regard to criminal conviction and incarceration. Id.
at 669.
71. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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minor's constitutional right to obtain an abortion free from state
interference.72 However, the Court undercut this holding considerably
by later upholding the constitutionality of a Utah parental notification
statute.73 The Supreme Court's inconsistent decisions appear to
reflect an attempt to balance the child's interest in obtaining an
abortion with the parents' interest in controlling their child's
actions.74
The Supreme Court also had trouble balancing the interests of
minors and parents in the context of civil commitment to psychiatric
care facilities. Although adults are entitled to an adversarial hearing
prior to civil commitment, the Court held that an adversarial hearing
is not required before a minor is involuntarily committed to an
inpatient psychiatric facility.75 The Court explained that a hospital's
72. Id. at 72-75. The Court invalidated the portion of a state law requiring blanket parental
consent for minors, stating that minors are protected by the Constitution and that constitutional
rights do not "magically" come into being solely upon reaching the age of majority. Id.
73. See H.L v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981) (holding that a Utah statute that
required physicians to notify the parents of a minor who was seeking an abortion was not
unconstitutional as applied to an unemancipated girl who was living with and dependent upon
her parents).
74. In addressing the issue of parental consent for abortion, the Court has stated that, "the
guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms
of minors." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979). See also How OLD IS OLD ENOUGH?,
supra note 30, at 50 (commenting that the inconsistent Supreme Court opinions regarding the
independent rights of minors reflect disagreement among justices regarding the relative power
of minors and their parents).
75. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620 (1979). This suit was a class action brought on
behalf of children in a Georgia state mental hospital. Id. at 587 n.2. The class challenged the
admission procedures for minors. Id. at 587. The procedure for admission consisted of a signed
application by a parent or guardian, observation of the child by hospital personnel, and a
determination by the hospital superintendent on whether to admit the child to the facility. Id. at
590-91. The Court referred to the admission of a child to a psychiatric hospital as "voluntary,"
assuming that most parents who initiate such a process for their child have their child's best
interests in mind. Id. at 602. The Court also noted that parents are in a better position to make
such decisions because children lack the "maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment
required for making life's difficult decisions." Id. The Court stated that "[m]ost children, even
in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions .. "
Id. at 603 (emphasis added). In response to the concern that some parents act contrary to their
child's best interest, the Court noted that this concern "creates a basis for caution, but is hardly
a reason to discard wholesale those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally
do act in the child's best interests." Id. at 602-03.
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non-adversarial admissions procedures satisfy due process
requirements because the Court assumed that parents who petition for
their child's commitment are acting in the child's best interest.
76
B. State Law and Children
Individual states have also addressed the legal capacity of minors.
As with the Supreme Court decisions, state laws often treat the
independent rights and responsibilities of minors inconsistently. In
particular, state laws often impose adult criminal responsibility on
delinquent minors but do not recognize non-delinquent minors'
independent legal rights."
The growing trend among states is to treat juvenile delinquents
like adults. This trend reflects society's increasing demand for
individual accountability7 and its fear of violent youth crime, 9 Many
While parents have the right to commit their children for psychiatric treatment, the state has
no duty to protect a child from a parent who does not have his child's best interest at heart. See
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't ofSoc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 194-97 (1989) (holding that
a state has no constitutional duty to protect a child from an abusive parent even if the abuse is
reported to local authorities). Another example of the inconsistent legal treatment of children
can be found by comparing Parham, 442 U.S. 584 (1979) with Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S.
707 (1979), discussed supra note 60. A minor is apparently competent enough to confess to
murder, yet not competent enough to object to being committed to a psychiatric hospital. See
Koocher, supra note 67, at 724-35 (discussing the inconsistencies in Supreme Court opinions
addressing a child's independent legal rights).
The inconsistency of the two opinions cited above is particularly perplexing in light of the
relevant population: Children who are processed through the juvenile justice system because of
delinquency are often the same children who end up in psychiatric hospitals and residential
treatment centers. See Ira M. Schwartz, Does Institutional Care Do More Harm Than Good?, in
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN CHILD WELFARE 275, 276 (Eileen Gambrill & Theodore J. Stein
eds., 1994) (describing the boundaries of juvenile justice and mental health institutions as
"porous").
76. Parham, 442 U.S. at 607. For a criticism of the Parham decision and the Court's
underlying assumptions regarding children and their families, see Gary B. Melton, Family and
Mental Hospital as Myths: Civil Commitment of Minors, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH, AND
THE LAw, supra note 6, at 151.
77. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Peter Annin, 'Superpredators' Arrive: Should We Cage the New Breed of
Vicious Kids?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1996, at 57 (discussing a new generation of teenagers,
called superpredators, who are extremely violent). For a discussion of the response by states to
the growing public concern about violent minors, see Feld I, supra note 20, at 842-45
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states are gradually moving away from the parens patriae approach
and are treating delinquent minors like adult criminals.8°
Additionally, other states now impose harsher penalties on minors
who commit crimes.8"
(discussing how recent amendments to the purpose sections of state juvenile codes reflects the
de-emphasis of the rehabilitation role of the juvenile court and emphasizes the need for
accountability and public safety). See also Tinkler, supra note 25, at 477 n.69 (providing
examples of state juvenile code purpose sections that emphasize public safety over youth
rehabilitation).
79. National statistics suggest that violent youth crimes have dramatically increased over
the last decade. According to statistics compiled by the FBI, the rate at which children between
the ages of fourteen and seventeen committed murder increased 160% from 1984 to 1991.
SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 56 (citing FBI statistics from 1976 to 1991). However,
juveniles are generally responsible for more property crimes than violent crimes. Id. at 48
(citing FBI statistics).
Illinois provides an example of a state's response to the public's fear of youth violence.
Illinois quickly changed its juvenile laws in 1994 to allow for the incarceration of younger
offenders after the sensational murder of a 5-year-old boy. Don Terry, Prison for Young Killers
Renews Debate on Saving Society's Lost, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1996 at Al. The Chicago boy
was dangled out a window by two other boys, ages 10 and 11, and dropped to his death. Id.
Ironically, Chicago, the "birthplace ofjuvenile justice," HOW OLD Is OLD ENOUGH?, supra note
30, at 40, has now become the national symbol of a new breed of violent offenders. World
News, supra note 9. See also Annin, supra note 78, at 57 (discussing the "new breed" of violent
youth in America).
It is important to note that while homicide rates have increased for juveniles, juveniles are
still only responsible for 8% of all murders, 13% of all rapes and robberies, and 11% of all
aggravated assaults. Id. So although it is true that juvenile crime has increased in the last ten
years, adults are still committing the vast majority of violent crimes in the United States.
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN YEARBOOK 57 (1995).
80. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. For additional examples of recent
legislation reflecting this national trend toward more punitive treatment of juveniles, see
Juvenile Justice Act of 1995, ch. 95-267, § 14, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1833, 1846 (West)
(codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.052(4Xa) (1996)) (requiring that a child of any age who is
indicted for a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment be tried and sentenced as an
adult); S.H.B. NO. 7025, P.A. 95-225, § 13, 1995 Conn. Legis. Serv. 648, 656 (West) (codified
at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46(b)-127 (West 1995)) (expanding mandatory transfer to
criminal court of minors to cover C and D felonies); Act No. 797, 1995 Ark. Adv. Legis. Serv.
127, 173-74 (Michie) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(b)(4) (Michie 1995) (allowing
for transfer to criminal court of minors who qualify as "habitual juvenile offenders"); 1995 Or.
Laws ch. 422, § 58.161.290(l) (lowering the age of criminal responsibility from 14 to 12 years
old).
81. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 59.003-.010 (West 1996). In 1996, Texas adopted a
specific set of "sanction levels" that apply to juveniles who commit delinquent acts, with the
severity of the sanction corresponding to the gravity of the offense. Id. For example, a capital
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Yet, while states begin to de-emphasize the importance of age in
regard to criminal responsibility, states continue to rely on the age of
juveniles when limiting their exercise of rights commonly enjoyed by
adults. For example, states commonly designate a minimum age
before a person can drink alcohol, drive a car, or get married.82
In spite of the inconsistencies of state and constitutional law, one
fact remains consistent: delinquent youths are far more likely to be
held to adult standards of responsibility than non-delinquent youths.
In fact, the degree of adult responsibility imposed on a delinquent
youth is directly related to the level of violence he displays in his
felony is assigned sanction level seven. Id. § 59.003. Sentencing guidelines for a level seven
crime include up to ten years of confinement in a residential program. Id. § 59.010.
82. Forst & Blomquist, supra note 27, at 371. The authors illustrate this point by
examining California's age requirements for such activities. A minor can work at 15; drive at
16; marry, vote and join the army at age 18; and purchase alcohol at 21. Id. Gradually granting
rights to minors is premised on the idea that minors are in a transitional stage during which their
maturity level is developing. Id. These age requirements are reflections of a person's gradual
development into adulthood and of the balancing of state and parental interests. HOW OLD IS
OLD ENOUGH?, supra note 30, at 45.
An illustration of the chaotic nature of the law's approach to children can be found by
comparing state law regarding criminal responsibility to state law regarding a child's
competence to be a witness. For example, in Missouri, a child under the age often years old is
incompetent to testify except in situations where the child is a victim of specific crimes of
sexual abuse. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060(2) (1996). But at the same time, it is now possible for
a child under the age of ten to be transferred to a court of general jurisdiction and tried as an
adult. Id. § 211.071.1. These laws suggest that a nine-year-old cannot give reliable testimony in
a court of law but can, conceivably, form the requisite mens rea for a crime such as first degree
murder. See also Koocher, supra note 67, at 724-25 (discussing the inconsistencies in Supreme
Court opinions addressing independent legal rights of children).
The Supreme Court has addressed the inconsistency of state law age requirements for
exercising various rights. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), the Court
recognized the minimum age requirements for serving on a jury, driving a car, getting married,
purchasing pornographic material, and gambling. Id. at 824. The Court acknowledged that state
legislation designating minimum age requirements for these activities is justified because
minors are "not prepared to assume the fIll responsibilities of an adult." Id. at 825. The Court
characterized these age requirements as a reflection of the difference in legal capacity between
an adult and a child:
[State age requirements] reflect] this basic assumption that our society makes about
children as a class; we assume that they do not yet act as adults do, and thus we act in
their interest by restricting certain choices that we feel they are not yet ready to make
with full benefit of the costs and benefits attending such decisions.
Id. at 825 n.23.
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delinquent acts. 3 When the legal status of children is examined in
whole, the unsettling result of these inconsistent policies is that
children are considered most competent when they are most
delinquent.
III. THE QUESTION OF COMPETENCE
Any discussion of children's legal rights requires consideration of
a child's ability to exercise the rights and responsibilities possessed
by adults. The doctrine ofparens patriae operates on the presumption
that minors are not legally competent and therefore, in the absence of
parental guidance, must be protected and guided by the state. 4 But
the issue of a minor's competence to handle adult rights and
responsibilities is not easily resolved, and many scholars examine a
child's competence from both psychological and legal perspectives."
From a psychological perspective, researchers have conducted
substantial research to determine the limits of children's capacity for
making decisions. 6 While young children clearly have diminished
decisionmaking abilities," most of this research suggests there is
little, if any, difference between the capacity of an adolescent and an
83. For example, in Missouri, a waiver hearing is mandatory for youth accused of most
violent crimes, regardless of the child's age. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.071.1 (1996). Yet a waiver
hearing is only discretionary for all other crimes, and only available for children age 12 and
older. Id.
84. See supra notes 26, 33-34 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Koocher, supra note 67, at 714-15 (using a developmental psychology
approach to examining the ability of children to make competent decisions); Federle, supra note
17, at 987-1011 (discussing the "capacity" of minors as the historical determinant of legal
rights); Gary B. Melton, Developmental Psychology and the Law: The State of the Art, 22 J.
FAM. L. 445, 448-50 (1984) (discussing children's competence from a psychological
perspective and the implications for independent legal rights).
86. Melton, supra note 85, at 462-66. Professor Melton summarizes an example of a well-
designed study in which 9-, 14-, 18-, and 21-year-old participants responded to hypothetical
situations involving decisions about medical and psychological treatment. Id. at 463. The
responses were evaluated based on "evidence of a choice; understanding of the facts; reasonable
decision-making process; [and] reasonable outcome of choice." Id.
87. Id.
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adult to make decisions.8
To some degree, the competence of any decision lies in the eye of
the beholder. Whether a decision is "good" or "bad" often depends on
the evaluator's personal opinion.89 However, researchers generally
agree that by the age of fourteen a child typically has as much ability
to make a competent decision as an adult does.90
A basic understanding of child development can help clarify how
age and cognitive development affect a child's decisionmaking
capacity. Jean Piaget, a renowned child developmental psychologist,
developed a model of cognitive development that ends with a final
stage called the "period of formal operations."'" The "period of
formal operations" which marks the development of the ability of
children to deal with the abstract, to hypothesize, and to contemplate
risks and future consequences9' of their actions, is usually reached
88. Id In fact, Professor Melton suggests that even young children, if given the
opportunity, tend to make decisions that will not cause them harm. Id.
The case of Larry Champagne I illustrates Professor Melton's point. Larry is a St. Louis
boy who found himself on a runaway school bus when the driver suffered a stroke. Carolyn
Bower, Boy Wonder; 5th-Grader Stops Bus After Driver Collapses, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Oct. 4, 1995, at IA. Although only 10 years old, Larry made the decision to run to the front of
the bus, take over the wheel, and hit the brakes, saving the lives of twenty other children. Id.
See also Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence to Provide Informed Consent for
Mental Health Treatment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 695 (1993). This article summarizes
research that suggests children are capable of making decisions about their own mental health
treatment. Id. at 708-09. Furthermore, this research suggests that treatment is more successful
when children are able to participate in treatment decisions. Id. The author emphasizes the fact
that children do not necessarily have to be logical in all respects to exhibit rational
decisionmaking capacity. Id at 716. In addition, the author states that "even adults typically
will not demonstrate perfect competence." Id.
89. Id. at 716-17. The author emphasizes that no person is capable of completely rational
decisionmaking. Id. He asserts that the relevant inquiry is what capacities adults use when
making a decision and whether the child in question has similar capacities. Id.
90. Melton, supra note 85, at 463; Redding, supra note 88, at 708. See also LAURENCE
HOULGATE, THE CHILD AND THE STATE: A NORMATIvE THEORY OF JUVENILE RIGHTS 61-74
(1980) (discussing that by age fourteen an adolescent has the capacity to make a rational choice,
whether or not he chooses to exercise it).
91. How OLD IS OLD ENOUGH?, supra note 30, at 27-29. See also JOHN H. FLAVELL ET
AL., COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 131 (1993) (summarizing Piaget's categorization of childhood
into stages of development).
92. HOw OLD IS OLD ENOUGH?, supra note 30, at 29. Piaget conducted research with
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before age fourteen.93 Piaget's theory is reflected throughout history,
as indicated in different societies by the designation of the age of
fourteen to signify important rites of passage.94
From a legal perspective, a child's ability or inability to make
competent decisions relates directly to the issue of criminal
responsibility. The historical justification for relieving children of
criminal responsibility was the belief that children were unable to
make competent decisions.95 At common law, a child's immaturity
and lack of competence was the basis for the irrebuttable presumption
that a child under the age of seven was not capable of forming the
much younger children as well, studying their ability to apply ideas of intentionality to
hypothetical situations. Lois A. Weithorn, Children's Capacities in Legal Contexts, in
CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH, AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 30. His research in this area
suggests that children as young as 10 are able to connect the concept of intentionality to
"naughtiness." Id. However, the study has been criticized because the hypothetical situations
were rather vague. Id. Furthermore, this research does not adequately address a child's ability to
predict the consequential events of any particular course of action. Id. at 3 1. See also HUGH
ROSEN, PATHWAY TO PIAGET 23 (1977) (quoting Piaget's proposition that most children reach
the formal operation period between the ages of 11-12 and 14-15, or at most by between 15 and
20 years of age).
93. HOW OLD IS OLD ENOUGH?, supra note 30, at 28. See also Koocher, supra note 67, at
715-18. The authors describe a child's ability to make competent decisions from the perspective
of his socialization, his grasp of time, and his ability to manipulate concepts. "[Age 14 is a]
good landmark age for the expectation by society that children use abstract reasoning skills, and
thus, that they be given increased responsibility." HOW OLD IS OLD ENOUGH?, supra note 30, at
29.
94. HOW OLD IS OLD ENOUGH?, supra note 30, at 7. For example, minors generally reach
puberty by the age of 14. Id. at 9. In addition, in the 17th century, marriage was common at age
fourteen. Id. Spiritual maturity is also considered to arrive by age 14 in both the Christian and
Jewish faiths. Id. Furthermore, compulsory education ended at age 14 until the 1930s. Id. at 11.
In the 18th century, the age for apprenticeship was 14. Id. at 12.
95. See supra notes 17-19, 26 and accompanying text. The historical rationale for the
presumption of incompetence in young children parallels the rationale of the insanity defense.
Weithom, supra note 92, at 27. In order to rebut the presumption of incompetence, the state had
to prove that the child understood the nature of his actions and could sufficiently distinguish
right from wrong. Id. The requirement that a child have the capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his actions before any criminal liability is imposed reflects the same policy as
does the insanity defense: that those incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong and of
appreciating the nature of their actions are not morally culpable and should not be held
criminally responsible. Id.
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requisite mens rea to commit most crimes.96 Between the ages of
seven and fourteen this presumption was rebuttable, and after age
fourteen courts afforded children the same criminal responsibility as
adults.97
IV. ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: DRAWING THE LINE FOR CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
It is well-established that children's competence and
decisionmaking abilities are not the same as adults.9 Because every
individual develops at his own pace, any attempt to make children's
legal rights and responsibilities correspond to age-related
developmental capacities will never be precise. However, the present
inconsistencies between trends in juvenile criminal responsibility and
legal rights for non-delinquent children are at least intellectually
disturbing and, in some cases, even morally questionable. 9
But what are the alternatives to the present system? If the system
grants minors full and complete legal rights to correspond to their
level of criminal responsibility, one might imagine scenes of nine-
year-olds driving cars and drinking alcohol.' 0 On the other hand, the
96. Weithom, supra note 92, at 26.
97. Id. at 27.
98. The Supreme Court has emphasized this point on several occasions. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988) ("Children, by definition, are not
assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves.") (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253,265 (1984)).
99. Forst & Blomquist, supra note 27, at 373.
As a result of recent reforms, youthful offenders are being asked to bear the liabilities
of the two worlds between which they stand-childhood with its attendant dependency
and immature judgment but without its protections and nurturance-and adulthood
with its attendant obligations and responsibilities, but without its freedoms and
independence.
Id. at 330.
100. For a discussion of what a world of "liberated children" would look like, see LAURA
M. PURDY, IN THEIR BEST INTERESTS? THE CASE AGAINST EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 124-
49 (1992). For example, would children be able to move out of their parents' home? Id. at 129-
30. Alternatively, would parents be able to move out and leave the children? Id. How would
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dramatic increase in youth crime and violence has dissuaded courts
and legislators from reducing juvenile criminal responsibility.'
Some commentators argue that all persons should be given a
rebuttable presumption of competence.0 2 Under this approach,
children of any age would be presumed competent to be responsible
for their actions unless they could establish that they are
incompetent.'0 3 However, this author believes that a presumption of
competence for all children does not truly address whether children
of any age may be competent. Instead, this approach ignores the
question of true competence in order to assuage society's fear of
youth violence and to satisfy public demand for punishment by
making it easier for courts to impose criminal responsibility on
children.' And considering public sentiment and media
family issues such as homework, sex, dress, and drugs be resolved? Id. at 142. Much of
Professor Purdy's book illustrates the tension between parental rights to raise children and a
child's independent right to self-determination.
101. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 58. There is evidence that the juvenile crimes
are of a much more violent nature than ever before. For example, the use of firearms by juvenile
homicide offenders has nearly tripled since 1983. Id. In addition, one quarter of all serious
crimes committed in 1991 involved at least one juvenile offender. Id, at 47. Furthermore, many
juveniles report carrying a gun all or most of the time, id at 53, and most juveniles report
having broken the law before the age of 18. Id at 49. Overall, juveniles were responsible for
approximately one out of every five violent crimes committed in 1991. Id. at 47.
102. See Hillary Rodham, Children's Rights: A Legal Perspective, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS:
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 21, 33 (Patricia A. Vardin & Ilene N. Brody eds., 1979) ("The
first thing to be done is to reverse the presumption of incompetency and instead assume all
individuals are competent until proven otherwise.").
103. Id. Ms. Rodham (now Rodham-Clinton) acknowledges that the implementation of this
proposal could be difficult, but no more difficult than implementing other areas of legislation.
Id at 33-34. Also, Ms. Rodham proposes this presumption of competence within the context of
a discussion about juvenile justice and the apparent lack of personal responsibility youths feel.
Id. She does not elaborate on how this presumption of competence would affect non-delinquent
youth. Id. at 34.
104. Ms. Rodham has, in fact, received significant criticism for her proposal to presume a
child competent until proven otherwise. The criticism, however, has primarily come from
political conservatives, who are concerned with giving children excessive freedom: .'[Ms.
Rodham] believes kids should be able to sue their parents rather than helping with the chores
they were asked to do."' Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children's Rights?, 80 MINN.
L. REv. 267, 269 (1995) (citation omitted).
With regard to proposals of such sweeping reforms as the one articulated by Ms. Rodham,
it is important to consider the era in which they were constructed. The most radical children's
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sensationalism, °5 it is difficult to envision a situation in which a
minor charged with a violent crime would be able to overcome the
presumption of competence.0 6
The presumption of competence approach also fails if granted to
non-delinquent children as well as juvenile delinquents. Parental
interests in the upbringing of their children would be ignored if all
children are presumed competent. For example, if an eleven-year-old
is presumed to be competent and decides she wants to quit school,
her parents must prove she is not competent to make that decision. At
eleven years old, the child might be capable of competent
decisionmaking, but that does not necessarily mean she will make
mature decisions.10
7
Other commentators have proposed that age eighteen should
constitute the age at which people are considered legally competent
for purposes of criminal responsibility. 8 However, this approach
ignores well established psychological research demonstrating that a
law reform proposals followed on the heels of the civil rights movement. Scholars attempted to
classify children as a group in need of liberation, just as racial minorities and women had been a
few years earlier. For a discussion of this "children's liberation movement" and its most radical
theorists, see Minow, supra, at 268-78. For a response to the "children's liberation movement,"
see generally PURDY, supra note 100, at 144-49 (detailing why the extension of full legal rights
to minors would be dangerous and disastrous).
105. See, e.g., Annin, supra note 78 (discussing a "new breed of vicious kids"); World
News, supra note 9 (discussing state measures taken to combat the problems of youth violence).
See also Smith, supra note 6, at 953-61 (1995) (citing several inflammatory and sensational
new headlines, describing youth violence in epidemic proportions).
106. Illinois is a good example of this point. In response to the horrifying murder of a five-
year-old by a 10- and 11-year-old, Illinois amended its juvenile laws to allow for younger
children to be sent to juvenile prison and/or waived into criminal court. See Terry, supra note
79, atAl.
107. Melton, supra note 85, at 465-66 ("[T]hat children have the capacity to perform
competently and responsibly does not mean that they will exercise such maturity of judgment,
particularly when the decision is made under circumstances of great stress or when social norms
elicit undesirable behavior.") See also HOULGATE, supra note 90, at 68 (distinguishing a child's
ability to make a rational decision from his willingness to do so).
108. Smith, supra note 6, at 989. Professor Smith urges that children should not be
transferred to criminal court: "Kids who commit crimes are kids. The mere fact that an 11-year-
old-or even a 17-year-old--commits a crime does not suddenly transform that child into an
adult." Id.
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child's cognitive and moral capacities often enable him to accept
criminal responsibility for his action at a younger age. 09 Moreover,
delaying criminal responsibility until age eighteen fails to adequately
address public interest in punishment and deterrence of violent
crimes committed by juveniles. "
Because of the substantial research demonstrating that an average
adolescent is capable of making competent decisions,"' and the state
interest in protecting society," 2 there is justification for holding
adolescents criminally responsible for their illegal actions. However,
holding very young children criminally responsible may not actually
protect society from crime. In fact, doing so may cause greater harm
to society because children who are incarcerated during their
developmental years will likely return to society more violent than
when they were first incarcerated." 3
Based on the psychological information currently available
regarding the cognitive and moral development of children,"4 the age
of fourteen represents an age at which most children are able to
exercise reasoning and decisionmaking skills on par with adults.
109. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
110. Professor Smith does propose that longer confinement be imposed on youth who
commit crimes. Smith, supra note 6, at 1020. However, the length of proposed juvenile
confinement does not come near the length of traditional sentences available in criminal court.
Id.
111. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
113. World News, supra note 9. David Lambert, of the National Center for Youth Law
commented on the two Illinois boys sent off to prison: "There is certainly a likelihood that these
two young offenders will emerge from this maximum security penitentiary even more violent
than they went in." Id.
See also Forst & Blomquist, supra note 27, at 374 ("[An incarcerated child] forgoes.., the
period of semi-responsibility and training for her adult life .. "); Smith, supra note 6, at 1008-
09 ("[A]ddressing crime by simply increasing punishment simply doesn't work. Though we are
now locking more kids up than ever before and are doing so for longer and longer periods, the
juvenile crime rate has not been affected."). Professor Smith describes a study conducted in the
early 1970's which suggests that children who are incarcerated not only continue to break the
law but also end up committing more serious crimes than other delinquents. Id. at 1009.
114. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, this author proposes that children over the age of fourteen
be given a rebuttable presumption of competence."' Because the
majority of children are capable of adult-like decisionmaking by the
age of fourteen,' the burden of proving incompetence should fall on
the defense. Furthermore, because the majority of juvenile
delinquents are over age fourteen," 7 this approach satisfies concerns
about public safety without subjecting younger children to criminal
responsibility beyond their level of competence.
Likewise, based on current psychological information, children
below age fourteen should be afforded a rebuttable presumption of
incompetence. States should return to an individualized approach," 8
based on psychological information regarding the child's cognitive
development. A child's individual level of cognitive development
serves as a better indicator of his criminal culpability than does the
severity of his crime." 9
Evidence regarding the cognitive capacity of typical fourteen-
year-olds applies equally to non-delinquent minors. 20 However,
society's ability to afford legal rights and responsibilities to non-
delinquent adolescents is complicated by parental interests in
childrearing. The fact that a child is capable of making good
115. The presumption of competence or incompetence should be rebuttable to allow for an
individual's personal rate of development. See Forst & Blomquist, supra note 27, at 365
(discussing the varying degrees of moral culpability of youth and proposing that courts could
apply the concept of diminished capacity to minors charged with crimes).
116. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
117. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, JUVENILES TAKEN INTO CUSTODY: FISCAL YEAR 1992 A-7 to A-9 (1995). For both
delinquency and status offenses, children ages 14 and older comprise the vast majority of
minors detained in the sample years of 1986 and 1990. Id.
118. See supra note 5 (describing the traditional process of waiver before to recent
reforms).
119. See Smith, supra note 6, at 989-91 (discussing the irrelevance of the particular crime
committed to whether a minor has the legal capacity and moral culpability necessary to be held
criminally responsible as an adult). See also Forst & Blomquist, supra note 27, at 364 ("[Moral
condemnation follows from the assumption that the criminal, having free will, knowingly and
consciously chooses to violate the law.").
120. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
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decisions does not necessarily guarantee that she will actually make
good decisions. 2' Because society places significant responsibility on
parents for the actions of their children outside the criminal context,
allowing children too much freedom to make decisions adverse to
their parents' interest is unwise. Accordingly, society must exercise
caution in affording complete legal rights and responsibility to
minors.
However, there should be a point at which society begins to rely
on adolescents' abilities to make competent decisions. Therefore, a
non-delinquent adolescent over the age of fourteen should also be
presumed to be competent. Parental interests should be weighed
against this presumption and adjustments in adolescents' rights made
appropriately.' And when no parental interest is involved, the
judgment of non-delinquent children over the age of fourteen should
be given even greater weight."
Drawing the line for criminal responsibility at age fourteen does
not guarantee an end to juvenile crime. But it does provide a
safeguard against "knee-jerk" responses" to media sensationalism
121. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
122. This author acknowledges that many scenarios exist in which a fourteen-year-old may
be capable of rational decisionmaking, yet parental interests directly conflict with the exercise
of the child's decision. For example, a child may have the psychological and cognitive capacity
to decide to quit school. However, the parental (and state) interest in educating the child so that
she becomes a self-sufficient adult is generally strong enough to outweigh the child's interest in
quitting school. But, in fact, in many districts children are allowed to legally quit school at age
sixteen or seventeen. Because a child of that age is more capable of supporting herself, the
parental interest is arguably weaker. In this way, child and parental interests are already
balanced by state law.
123. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the absence of a parental interest may alter
the weight given to a child's opinion. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 619 (1979) (leaving
open the question of whether hospital admission of wards of the state should be handled any
differently than children who have parents). See also Koocher, supra note 67, at 720-23
(questioning the objectiveness of mental health personnel at profit-making hospitals and the
wisdom of allowing such broad discretion in admittance criteria for minors, especially those
minors without an involved parent).
124. Schlinkmann & Bell, supra note 4, at 2B (quoting Kimberly Kempf Leonard, a
criminologist at the University of Missouri at St. Louis: "[The new juvenile laws are] a knee-
jerk reaction to appease public concern.").
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and public panic."z There is also no guarantee that weighing parental
interests against a non-delinquent adolescent's competence will
provide a solution to every conflict between child and parental
interests. It does, however, ensure that the law will recognize an
adolescent's emerging independence and give it the weight it
deserves. Furthermore, it protects an adolescent's legal rights when
he is "good," not just when he is "bad."
CONCLUSION
The more important, indeed the vital thing, is to prevent the
children from reaching that condition in which they have to be
dealt with in any court, and we are not doing our duty to the
children of to-day, the men and women of to-morrow, when we
neglect to destroy the evils that are leading them into careers
of delinquency, when we fail not merely to uproot the wrong,
but to implant in place of it the positive good.... The work
demands the united and aroused efforts of the whole
community, bent on keeping children from becoming criminals,
determined that those who are treading the downward path
shall be halted and led back.
126
There are no easy answers to the growing problem of juvenile
crime. But today's trend of lowering the age of criminal
responsibility has not proven effective.'27 Given the available
information on a child's cognitive development,'28 this trend is also
morally unsound. Furthermore, the presumptions that society is
willing to make regarding a delinquent child's legal capacity are not
consistent with the presumptions made regarding non-delinquent
children.
125. See supra note 80.
126. Mack, supra note 15, at 122.
127. See supra note 113.
128. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
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Regardless of the current statistics on juvenile crime, it is time to
draw the line. And the line should be drawn evenly for delinquent
and non-delinquent children. Although drawing the line at age
fourteen will not solve the problem of juvenile delinquency, it will
provide a consistent degree of expectation and privilege for minors.
The problems of juvenile delinquency and violent youth crime cannot
be meaningfully addressed until we refocus on the underlying causes
of juvenile delinquency and provide our children with guidance
instead of punishment.
Jacqueline Cuncannan*
* M.S.W. 1994, Grand Valley State University; J.D. 1997, Washington University.
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol51/iss1/4
